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Protective Information Technologies *
Tamara Dinev
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Qing Hu
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While there is a rich body of literature on user acceptance of technologies with positive outcomes, little is known about
user behavior toward what we call protective technologies: information technologies that protect data and systems from
disturbances such as viruses, unauthorized access, disruptions, spyware, and others. In this paper, we present the results
of a study of user behavioral intention toward protective technologies based on the framework of the theory of planned
behavior. We find that awareness of the threats posed by negative technologies is a strong predictor of user behavioral
intention toward the use of protective technologies. More interestingly, in the presence of awareness, the influence of
subjective norm on individual behavioral intention is weaker among basic technology users but stronger among
advanced technology users. Furthermore, while our results are consistent with many of the previously established
relationships in the context of positive technologies, we find that the determinants “perceived ease of use” and
“computer self-efficacy” are no longer significant in the context of protective technologies. We believe that this result
highlights the most significant difference between positive technologies and protective technologies: while the former
are used for their designed utilities, for which usefulness and ease of use have a significant impact, the latter are used
out of fear of negative consequences, for which awareness becomes a key determinant. We discussed the theoretical
and practical implications of these findings. The findings of this study extend the theory of planned behavior to the
context of protective technologies and shed insights on designing effective information security policies, practices, and
protective technologies for organizations and society.
Key Words: Awareness, spyware, technology acceptance, theory of planned behavior, protective technology, behavioral
intention.
* This paper was submitted on May 1, 2006 for fast tracking from the 2005 pre-ICIS HCI Workshop. The paper went
through two revisions. Dennis Galletta was the accepting senior editor.

Volume 8, Issue 7, Article 2, pp. 386-408, July 2007

Volume 8

Issue 7

Article 2

The Centrality of Awareness in the Formation of User Behavioral Intention toward Protective
Information Technologies *

1. Introduction
The rampant spread of computer viruses across global networks and frequent security breaches in organizations have elevated
the management of information security from the backrooms to the boardrooms of organizations in the global community
(Deloitte, 2005). The high level of digital connectivity, powered by innovations in computing and communication
technologies, has not only enabled the rapid globalization of economic activities and brought prosperity to communities large
and small, it has also created unprecedented opportunities for the dark side of technological advancement to emerge and
prosper. Computer viruses, spyware, cyber attacks, and computer system security breaches are daily occurrences. In the ten
year period from 1993 to 2003, the number of security incidents reported to CERT increased from 1,334/year to
137,529/year (CERT, 2004). These attacks have resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in financial losses to U.S.
companies and other organizations including government agencies (Gordon et al., 2004, 2005). The losses are much more
worldwide (Mercuri, 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 2004). A recent survey of managers in more than 1,300 organizations in 55
countries reveals that the sheer number of security-related regulations and the consequences of non-compliance have led
information security to be a top priority in boardrooms (Ernst & Young, 2005).
In order to effectively manage and control the ever-evolving and growing security threats, it is obviously not enough just to rely
on deployment of security technologies such as anti-virus and intrusion detection software and hardware. Studies in recent
years have repeatedly shown that information security is a socio-technological problem that requires thorough understanding
of the weakest link in the defense against security threats: human behavior and attitudes about using these security
technologies (Goodhue and Straub, 1991; Straub and Welke, 1998; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001; Hu et al., 2006).
However, research literature that deals with human behavior as it relates to using technologies—such as the literature on
innovation diffusion and technology acceptance—is usually concerned with technologies designed or intended to have clearly
identifiable benefits for their users. Thus, it is understandable that the extant research is biased toward positive technologies,
both within organizations where better job performance is a desirable outcome (e.g. Rogers, 1995; Davis et al., 1989;
Igbaria 1994; Gefen and Straub, 1997) and outside organizations where adoption of technologies such as the Internet for ecommerce take place (e.g., Gefen and Straub, 2000; Gefen et al., 2003; Koufaris, 2002; Pavlou, 2003; Pavlou and
Fygenson, 2006).
However, the expansion of computer and Internet use in organizations and society at large has also generated many
unintended consequences. While individuals, organizations, and society have benefited from the widespread application of
information technology (IT), computer users and organizations have become increasingly vulnerable to the threats posed by
technologies designed to disrupt or harm systems, individuals, and organizations. The variety and complexity of cyber attacks,
viruses, and spyware have grown in parallel to the technologies designed to protect individual users and organizational
systems. As more and more security products are developed and deployed, people who wish to use technology for ill-gotten
gains seem to find ways to penetrate or bypass these products. As developers strengthen security products in response, the
attacks become more sophisticated, creating an ever-escalating and quickening cycle of attack and defense (Bagchi and Udo,
2003; Lipson, 2002).
In this study, we use the term “positive technologies” to refer to those technologies that are designed to benefit their users in
terms of productivity, efficiency, competitiveness, or entertainment. On the other hand, “negative technologies” refer to those
that are designed to disrupt or harm their users, such as computer viruses, spyware, and tools for breaking into systems and
databases. We define “protective technologies” as those that are designed to deter, neutralize, disable, or eliminate the
negative technologies or their effectiveness, such as anti-virus software, anti-spyware tools, firewalls, and intrusion detection
technologies. Although it can be argued that there is not much difference between positive and protective technologies, since
both provide their users a set of utilities, we submit that the ways through which these utilities manifest themselves and the
resulting user perceptions of their value are quite different, thus they deserve separate consideration in the context of user
technology acceptance research.
Positive technologies, such as office automation applications, enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, and e-commerce
technologies, contribute directly to the productivity and performance of their users and are often viewed as necessary and
essential. Protective technologies, on the other hand, contribute to the wellbeing of their users indirectly and subtly and are
often viewed by organizational users as extra burdens to the work routine (Hu et al., 2006) and viewed by individual users as
annoying (Hu and Dinev, 2005). For example, it is very common that users of process- and resource-intensive applications,
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such as image and video processing, digital electronic design tools, or 3D visualization applications, are advised to disable
other processes running on their computers, especially anti-virus or anti-spyware tools. Thus, in the mind of an electrical
engineer, there is a clear distinction between the positive technology she uses daily to perform her digital design work and
the protective technology (anti-virus or anti-spyware program) that she has to turn on and off and may even consider to be
impeding her work. It is not an uncommon observation by corporate IT security teams that employees are annoyed and
unappreciative when their work is interrupted in order to perform routine security checks of their systems. This important
distinction clearly calls for a better understanding of users’ attitudes toward and use of protective technologies in work and
home environments.
The study of negative technologies is just beginning to emerge (e.g., Bagchi and Udo, 2003; Stafford and Urbaczewski,
2004; Hu and Dinev, 2005). As recognized by Stafford and Urbaczewski (2004), in the case of spyware, little empirical
work supports the many suppositions being made about spyware and its effects on personal and business computing.
Strong theoretical foundations and empirical validations are still lacking for understanding user behavior in response to
negative technologies such as spyware. Fortunately, this situation is changing, and researchers and practitioners have
begun to pay more attention to negative technologies, as indicated by a recent special issue of the Communications of the
ACM on spyware.
If there is a lack of research on the effect of negative technologies, we submit that there are virtually no studies on user
behavior pertaining to protective technologies. In order to design effective policies and practices at the individual,
organizational, and societal levels to successfully defend against negative technologies, a thorough understanding of user
attitudes and intentions toward and behavior surrounding protective technologies is clearly called for. Given the broad
range of protective technologies and their use context, in this study we choose to focus on the attitudes and behavior of
individual computer users. We are interested in the protective technologies that individuals install and manage on their own
systems. Thus, we exclude the category of protective technologies deployed in organizational security network infrastructure
(e.g. packet filters, secure routers, second or third generation firewalls, etc.). Additionally, we define use of protective
technologies as a user’s conscious and voluntary involvement in protecting against negative technologies in the forms of
installing, running, and updating protective software tools.
It is important to note that an individual’s conscious use of protective technologies may vary depending on the usage
environment. In many organizations, installations and maintenance of protective technologies (e.g. anti-virus packages and
firewall protection) are installed and run automatically on employees’ systems and are largely transparent to the end users.
In contrast, in some organizations and most homes, where a significant portion of overall computer and Internet use occurs,
users are extensively exposed to the threats of various negative technologies, and therefore conscious and active use of
protective technologies is critical for the protection of their computers and systems. What makes the matter even more
complex is the fact that these two very different environments (home and work) often commingle. More and more users are
using computers (including mobile computers) both within the boundaries of an organizational environment where they are
fairly well protected by the carefully-designed organizational security policies and technologies and from their homes, where
they are also connected to corporate networks via their home computers over which they have complete control about
which technologies and what applications to download, install, and use. In addition, many advanced computer users have
enough privileges to disable or enable at will various anti-virus or anti-spyware tools running on their work systems. The
security and privacy risks in this type of environment are both high and convoluted. Thus, protecting organizational or
individual information assets necessarily involves the conscious and active use of protective technologies by each employee
at work and at home. As a consequence, it is more critical than ever before to understand how users perceive the threats,
and how they use protective technologies designed to help them reduce or eliminate the risk.
Thus, in this study, we are interested in addressing the following research questions: What are the factors that influence
intentions to use protective technologies and how do they contribute to the formation of this intention? In attempting to
answer these questions, we recognize the need to develop a coherent and strong theoretical foundation. We contend that
the well-researched user technology acceptance models concerning positive technologies that are either performance- or
hedonics-oriented (e.g., Venkatesh et al., 2003; Van der Heijden, 2004) may not fully explain user behavior in the context
of protective technologies, where the desired outcome of use is the preservation of the well being of the computer system,
i.e., the initial status quo. To understand user attitude and behavior in this context, we draw on the theory of planned
behavior (Azjen, 1988) and introduce awareness as a core construct in user behavioral modeling based on the exploratory
works of Goodhue and Straub (1991), Stafford and Urbaczewski (2004), and Hu and Dinev (2005).
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In section 2, we build our research model and develop our research
hypotheses. In section 3, we describe the research methodology, survey instrument, and data collected. In section 4, we
present results of a confirmatory factor analysis on the validity of the survey instrument and the results of the structural
equation modeling of the proposed user behavioral model surrounding protective technologies. In section 5, we provide
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some analyses of the test results and contrast those with the findings in the technology acceptance literature. Finally, in
section 6, we summarize the major findings of this study and discuss their theoretical and practical implications.

2. Theoretical Development of Research Model
2.1 Theories of Technology Acceptance
To understand user behavior pertaining to protective technologies, we start with a review of the theory of planned behavior
(TPB) (Ajzen, 1988, 2002) and the technology acceptance model (TAM) (Davis, 1989; Davis et al., 1989; Venkatesh and
Davis, 2000; Venkatesh et al., 2003), two of the most widely cited theoretical frameworks in the IS literature on user
technology acceptance. Both models originate from the theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). TPB
contends that a person’s behavior is determined by her intention to perform the behavior of interest. This behavioral
intention (BI) is, in turn, determined by three factors: attitude toward the behavior (AB), subjective norm (SN), and perceived
behavioral control (PBC). AB refers to a person’s judgment about whether it is good or bad to perform a behavior of
interest. A favorable attitude is likely to encourage individuals to perform the behavior. SN is a person’s perception of the
social pressure to perform or not perform the behavior in question. SN thus reflects the person’s perceptions of whether the
behavior is accepted and encouraged by social circles consisting of people who are important to her. Empirical findings in
research suggest a positive relationship between SN and BI (e.g., Taylor and Todd, 1995; Karahanna et al., 1999;
Venkatesh and Davis, 2000; Venkatesh et al., 2003), however lack of statistical significance between SN and BI has also
been reported (e.g. Mathieson, 1991; Pavlou and Fygenson, 2006).
Perceived behavioral control (PBC) is the perceived ease or difficulty of performing a behavior and a personal sense of
control over performing it (Ajzen, 1988). PBC is theorized as an antecedent to both intention and behavior (Ajzen, 1988,
2002; Taylor and Todd, 1995; Pavlou and Fygenson, 2006). However, the nature and measurement of PBC has been one
of the most controversial issues in TPB (see Pavlou and Fygenson, 2006 for more details). Ajzen later (2002) suggests that
self-efficacy (SE) and controllability (C) are separable components of PBC. Self-efficacy is defined as the individual’s
judgment of his or her skills and capabilities to perform the behavior (Bandura, 1986). Controllability is defined as the
individual’s judgment about the availability of resources and opportunities to perform the behavior (Ajzen, 2002; Pavlou
and Fygenson, 2006). It is a common view that SE reflects internal personality factors, while C reflects beliefs about external
factors and resources. While Pavlou and Fygenson (2006) applied SE and C as underlying formative indicators to PBC (PBC
treated as a higher order construct), staying faithful to Ajzen’s (2002) arguments, SE and C have also been incorporated in
Taylor and Todd’s (1995) decomposed TPB as distinct constructs influencing PBC in causal relationships. It is worth noting
that the conceptualization of SE and C and their relationship to PBC is still debatable (Trafimow et al., 2002).
In response to the limitations associated with TRA (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1988) in predicting and explaining user
acceptance of a new technology, Davis (1989) and Davis et al. (1989) developed TAM as an extension to TRA. Similar to
TRA and TPB, the original TAM predicts that attitudes toward a new technology are a factor in its adoption and use. It
highlights two key determinants of user acceptance of a new technology: perceived ease of use (PEOU) and perceived
usefulness (PU). PEOU is defined as the extent to which the user believes that usage will be effortless. PU is the degree to
which a user believes that using the particular technology would enhance her work performance in an organizational
context.
While PEOU and PBC are both concerned with the perceived ability to perform a behavior, PEOU is an attitudinal belief
about the amount of effort applied, while PBC is a control belief and situational perception. A user of technology might
perceive that it is easy to use, but could still feel that she does not have control over the process of use. Ajzen (2002) writes
that PBC should be “read as perceived control over the performance of a behavior” (p. 668). Pavlou and Fygenson (2006)
also found that PEOU influenced PBC (through the underlying dimensions SE and C) in their TPB-based online user
behavioral model.

2.2 The Role of Attitude in TAM models
Numerous empirical studies have provided support for TAM (see Venkatesh et al., 2003 for a detailed review). The original
TAM (Davis et al., 1989) empirically validated a partial mediation of attitude, while subsequent studies eliminated attitude
as a predictor of IT usage (Venkatesh and Davis, 1996; Venkatesh, 1999; Venkatesh, 2000; Venkatesh and Davis, 2000).
As a result, the majority of TAM models propose a direct path from PEOU and PU to BI, without attitude as a mediating
construct. Most subsequent studies have followed this framework (Gefen and Straub, 1997; Koufaris, 2002; Gefen et al.,
2003; Venkatesh et al., 2003; Van der Hejden, 2004). Because TRA and TPB insist that attitude completely mediates the
relationships between beliefs and intention, the majority of TAM-related studies therefore contradict the basic principle of
TPB and TRA. The explanation found in the extant TAM literature is that, “within organizational settings, people form
intentions towards behaviors they believe will increase their job performance, over and above whatever positive or negative
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feelings may be evoked toward the behavior per se” (Davis et al., 1989, p. 986). Thus, the direct PU-BI (and PEOU-BI)
effect in TAM implies that intentions to use technology may be less affected by the individual's overall attitude toward that
technology. In other words, even though an employee may dislike a technology, she may still use it if it is perceived to
increase job performance. Furthermore, Venkatesh et al. (2003), in their Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of
Technology (UTAUT) model, have eliminated the role of attitudes by arguing that attitude will not have a direct effect on
intention when performance and effort expectancy constructs are included in the model. They consider “any observed
relationship between attitude and intention to be spurious and resulting from omission of the other key predictors” (p. 455).
In contrast, Taylor and Todd (1995), in their decomposed TPB model, empirically validated the complete mediation of
attitude between PU and PEOU and behavioral intention, as did Bagozzi et al. (1989) and Pavlou and Fygenson (2006).
However, the results and explanatory power have been somewhat mixed (see Dillon and Morris, 1996 for a detailed
discussion). Models faithful to TPB have exhibited only a moderate increase in explanatory power for intentions. The
decomposed TPB adds seven more variables only to increase the predictive power of behavior by 2 percent over TAM
(Dillon and Morris, 1996).
Notwithstanding the inconsistencies and contractions among the various models of user technology acceptance, the basic
frameworks of TPB and TAM have been shown to be robust in explaining and predicting user behavior toward technological
innovations in general, as evident in the sheer number of studies based on these two frameworks.
Despite the major differences between the positive and protective technologies outlined in the previous section, the use of
both technologies ultimately brings identifiable benefits to the end user, thus the adoption of both is a desirable outcome.
Based on the theoretical review above, we believe that the most theoretically sound approach to investigating the user’s
conscious behavior toward protective technologies is to adopt the rich framework of TPB, complemented by the two TAM
constructs PEOU and PU, as in Pavlou and Fygenson (2006). In the context of protective technology use, we find no strong
arguments against the established constructs and relationships in the technology acceptance literature. However, given the
unique characteristics of protective technologies, we suspect that many, if not all, of the relationships will change. To test
these relationships and to ensure the theoretical completeness and integrity of our research model, we decided to include
all TPB-related constructs and relationships as presented in Pavlou and Fygenson (2006) in our research model. In addition,
in order to be consistent with both the TPB and the original TAM model (Davis et al., 1989), we treat attitude as a partially
mediating variable in the PEOU-BI and PU-BI relationships. However, given the preponderance of the theoretical and
empirical studies of these constructs and relationships, we choose not to elaborate on these established relationships as our
research hypotheses, though they are included in our research model to preserve the theoretical integrity of the research
model. We summarize these relationships in Table 1 and present them in Figure 1.

2.3 Technology Awareness
The concept of awareness first appeared in the innovation diffusion theory (IDT) (Rogers, 1995) and was used as the initial
stage of an innovation diffusion process model. According to this theory, innovation diffusion involves two different actors: a
company or organization that will adopt the innovation or new technology, and users or individuals who will use the
innovation or technology. Further, the decision making process of innovation adoption involves five steps: awareness,
attitude formation, decision, implementation, and confirmation. Awareness is defined as the extent to which a target
population is conscious of an innovation and formulates a general perception of what it entails. During the awareness
stage, an organization or individual is exposed to the existence of the innovation and is provided information on how the
innovation functions and what its benefits are. Thus, awareness is an antecedent for the attitude formation stage of
innovation diffusion. In the framework of TPB, this would mean that awareness is an antecedent of attitudes and behavioral
intentions. Clearly, based on our classification of technologies, awareness in IDT is developed from the perspective of
positive technologies.
There are two major differences between the IDT as outlined above and diffusion of the protective technology among
individuals not bound within an organization. The first is that there are not two actors but only one – the individual with his
or her computer who is solely responsible for deciding whether or not to adopt and use a protective technology. The second
difference is that the technology in question is not positive but protective, and as argued in the Introduction, its benefits may
not be as clear to the individual. Therefore, we expect that the concept of awareness, although rooted in the IDT, will need
to be further developed through the lens of negative technologies and the need for protection and prevention strategies.
Unlike technology innovations and positive technology use in organizations and e-commerce adoption by individuals, the
existence of threats from negative technologies is often not known to users because negative technologies are installed
surreptitiously and work unnoticed. Also, less known to the users are the strategies and tools for protection from these
threats. In many ways, combating negative technologies resembles the fight against disease, crime, and social injustice.
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Social and medical sciences have long recognized the importance of raising public and individual awareness in such
battles. In the literature of social science, criminal justice, and medical behavioral science (e.g., Snell et al., 1991), the
concept of awareness is central to human behavior. Awareness is viewed as one of the key components of consciousnessraising, and brings about an appreciation of the needs, impetus, and specificity of issues, events, and processes. Previous
social sciences research defines social awareness as naming the problem, speaking out, raising consciousness, and
researching. It is further defined as an individual’s active involvement and increased interest in focal issues (Bickford and
Reynolds, 2002; Green and Kamimura, 2003; Tillman, 2002). Social awareness has been positively linked to individuals’
attitudes and cognitive development (Tsui, 2000; Perry, 1970; Piaget, 1975), and to privacy concerns (Dinev and Hart,
2006).
Following Dinev and Hart (2006), we adopted the concept of awareness of technological issues and define technology
awareness as a user’s raised consciousness of and interest in knowing about technological issues and strategies to deal with
them. It is only logical to assume that before an individual can form either positive or negative beliefs about using protective
technologies, she must first be made aware of the issues surrounding negative technologies. More specifically, she must be
aware of (a) the potential threats and consequences of poor or no protection and (b) the availability and effectiveness of
protective technologies. Our broader definition of technology awareness reflects the fact that awareness of a solution is
often preceded by awareness of a problem, i.e., there is a need for shields only if there are spears. Support for this
conceptualization of awareness that includes problems and solutions, is very well stated by Rogers (1995):

…awareness must be initiated by the individual and is not a passive act. Hassinger points out that
information about new ideas often does not create awareness, even though the individual may be exposed
to this information, unless the individual has a problem or a need that the innovation promises to solve.
Perhaps one is faced with a chicken-and-egg type of question. Does a need precede awareness of an
innovation or does awareness of a new idea create a need for that innovation? The available research
studies do not yet provide a clear answer to this question, but tentative evidence suggests the latter is more
common (p.82).
Negative technologies belong to the class of technologies that have emerged as a problem, a threat, or a “disease” so to
speak, as opposed to positive technologies whose developers intend for them to be beneficial to organizations and
individuals. In security materials, survey and academic studies, IT executives and security managers talk about the
importance of “raising awareness of security threats” (e.g., Deloitte, 2005; Ernst and Young, 2005; Hu and Dinev, 2005;
and Hu et al., 2006). A comprehensive “Security Awareness, Training, and Education” program, also known as SETA or
SATE, is now widely recommended for securing computer-based resources (NIST SP 800-12, 2006). SETA gives
recommendations to maintain a high degree of awareness of the computers’ operating state (Stafford and Urbaczewski,
2004). Evidently, “awareness” is already present in the vocabulary of organizations. However, it has yet to be formally
conceptualized as a theoretical construct in information security research, with its validity and importance scientifically
established.
In the case of individual use of protective technologies, technology awareness is a key factor in understanding user
behavior. Goodhue and Straub (1991) were among the first IS scholars who suggested that awareness was an important
factor in an individual’s belief about information security. They predicted that computer abuse would be a major problem
that would not diminish on its own and argued that “a lack of awareness of the danger may lead to weak vigilance by users
and greater potential for abuse” (p.14). They argued that “people who are more aware of the potential for abuse would be
sensitized to the dangers of inadequate security and would more likely feel that security was unsatisfactory” (p.15). Further
they argued that awareness was related to computer literacy and, thus, defined and operationalized awareness as years of
experience, managerial level, and user/systems staff status. The authors found weak and partial support of their hypotheses
that awareness of technology will result in a higher level of concern for security. They concluded that the likely reason for
their result was that the years of experience with information systems was a weak measure of security awareness, injecting
additional error and noise into their measurements. Nevertheless, the importance of this study far outweighs those identified
weaknesses.
The conceptual treatment of awareness in IDT is different from the one in Goodhue and Straub (1991) and this study. The
former focuses on “spreading the word” about a positive product (a specific innovation with a potential to increase
productivity), that is already created and ready to be implemented. In the context of Goodhue and Straub (1991) and our
study, awareness is not about one product, one application, or one technology. It is knowledge of an existing problem, and
potential solutions may or may not exist. In this sense, awareness is closer to situational awareness and problem solving –
identifying the problem, speaking out, raising consciousness, and researching solutions to resolve the problem.
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Drawing on these prior studies, we argue that the level of technological awareness influences the attitudes and beliefs of
users about the need for defending against security threats from negative technologies. Indeed, the more knowledgeable a
user is about the problems and consequences of security attacks and the ways to protect against them, the more likely that
she will form a positive attitude toward the use of protective technologies. Thus, we propose:

H1: Technology awareness positively influences user attitudes toward using protective technologies.
In addition to the attitude toward behavior, according to TPB, the behavioral norms of an individual user’s social group
have a strong influence on the behavioral intention of the individual (Ajzen, 1988). However, the behavioral norms of the
social group regarding negative or protective technologies are inevitably influenced by its members’ awareness of the
technologies and their consequences. The process of building awareness of problems is found to guide the development of
a social network of organizations that strongly advocates for policies and programs to reduce the problems (Biglan and
Taylor, 2000). A critical step in this process is a thorough articulation of the problem achieved through extensive
communications to the groups that matter, resulting in stronger group norms (Biglan and Taylor, 2000). In the case of
spyware and security breaches that affect Internet users, social networks and groups are likely to be formed by the parties
interested in solving the specific problems (Stafford and Urbaczewski, 2004). By building alliances and educating users
broadly through the media, these networks could change computer users’ group norms regarding tolerance of spyware and
other negative technologies. In this process, it is reasonable to argue that the higher the degree of awareness among the
members of the social group, the stronger the group norms about using protective technologies. Thus, we propose:

H2: Technology awareness positively influences subjective norms about using protective technologies.
We must note that the relationship between technology awareness (TA) and subjective norm (SN) may have causation
leading in both directions. In other words, an established group norm about a certain behavior can, through spreading the
word and enhancing communications, affect the level of awareness among individuals in the social group. This dual
directionality is similar to the nature of the relationship between SN and PU. For example, it is well established that if a
technology is perceived as useful, it will be more likely to be embraced as a norm in a social group, i.e., PU affects SN.
However, in their TAM2 model, Venkatesh and Davis (2000) argued the opposite – SN is a determinant of PU in light of the
argument that if one’s peers have a positive opinion about the usefulness of a technology, one is more likely to form a
positive belief about its usefulness as well. In choosing the hypothesized causality between TA and SN, we followed the
predominant direction between PU and SN in the literature. Indeed, without members of a social group being aware of a
problem or threat, a social norm cannot be established in the first place.
In addition, the literature on TAM presented in Section 2.1 overwhelmingly favors direct links between PEOU/PU and
behavioral intention (BI). Using the same logic, we submit that a direct relationship between TA and BI can be supported
even more strongly in our research model. The consequences of not using protective technologies—such as identity theft,
negative publicity, significant financial loss, and uncertain legal consequences—could be devastating to individuals and
organizations. Since such consequences are often reported in the popular media, we argue that awareness alone could
motivate a user to take action, regardless of whether he has formed a positive attitude or is influenced by the social group
norms. This argument is supported by other studies on crime and disease prevention where heightened awareness directly
influences intention to engage in certain behaviors (Carleton et al., 1996; Carlson et al., 1988). Therefore, we propose:

H3: Technology awareness positively influences user intention to use protective technologies.
Integrating the awareness construct and the hypothesized relationships into the well-established TBP theoretical framework
yields the research model of this study, as shown in Figure 1. The theoretical and empirical support for the causal linkages
in TAM and TPB is readily available in the literature and does not need to be repeated here. However, for the clarity of
discussion, we have labeled these relationships R1, R2, … R11, with their main sources listed in Table 1 .

3. Research Methodology and Data
3.1. Anti-Spyware as Protective Technology
Numerous protective technologies exist in organizational and personal computing environments, such as anti-virus, antispyware, firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention, encryption, and decryption. In order to empirically test our model of
user behavior surrounding protective technologies, we chose anti-spyware, the protective technology that is designed to
counter the relatively new, but rapidly expanding, negative technology category of spyware. Spyware has become an
epidemic security threat in recent years, allowing an indirect infiltration into computer systems. It is often surreptitiously
installed on computers to silently track user computing activities such as web browsing and to sometimes even record
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H3

Technology
Awareness (TA)

Behavioral
Intention (BI)

R11

Perceived
Usefulness (PU)

R10

H1
R6

Perceived Ease
of Use (PEOU)

R1

R2

R3

Attitude (AB)
R8
R7

Self-efficacy
(SE)

R5

Controllability
(C)

R4

H2

Subjective
Norm (SN)

R9

Perceived
Behavioral
Control (PBC)

Figure 1: Awareness centric model of user behavior toward protective technologies
Table 1: Summary of the hypotheses and previously established relationships in the research model
Relationships
H1
H2
H3
R1
R2

Description
Technology Awareness -> Attitude toward
Behavior
Technology Awareness -> Subjective Norm
Technology Awareness -> Behavioral Intention
Attitude toward Behavior - >
Behavioral Intention
Subjective Norm -> Behavioral Intention

R3

Perceived
Intention

R4

Perceived Controllability ->
Perceived Behavioral Control
Self-Efficacy ->
Perceived Behavioral Control
Perceived Usefulness ->
Attitude toward Behavior
Perceived Usefulness->Subjective Norm
Perceived Ease of Use ->
Attitude toward Behavior
Perceived Ease of Use ->
Perceived Behavioral Control
Perceived Ease of Use ->
Behavioral Intention

R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11

Behavioral

Perceived Usefulness ->
Behavioral Intention

Control

->

Behavioral

Source
Current study
Current study
Current study
Ajzen (1988, 2002), Davis et al. (1989),
Taylor and Todd (1995)
Ajzen (1988, 2002), Taylor and Todd
(1995), Venkatesh and Davis (2000),
Pavlou and Fygenson (2006)
Ajzen (1988, 2002), Mathieson (1991),
Taylor and Todd (1995), Pavlou and
Fygenson (2006)
Ajzen (2002), Taylor and Todd (1995),
Pavlou and Fygenson (2006)
Davis et al. (1989), Taylor and Todd
(1995), Pavlou and Fygenson (2006)
Venkatesh and Davis (2000)
Davis et al. (1989), Taylor and Todd
(1995), Pavlou and Fygenson (2006)
Pavlou and Fygenson (2006)
Davis et al. (1989), Venkatesh and
Davis (1996), Gefen and Straub (1997),
Venkatesh (1999), Venkatesh (2000),
Venkatesh and Davis (2000), Koufaris
(2002), Gefen et al, (2003), Venkatesh
et al. (2003), Van der Hejden (2004)
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keystrokes (Doyle, 2003; Taylor, 2002; Stafford and Urbaczewski, 2004). Under the category of spyware several variations
exist, such as adware, key loggers, and Trojan horses. Recent media attention to spyware (Cha, 2004; Gutner, 2004;
Mitchell, 2004; O’Brien and Hansell, 2004) has revealed that it is often a hidden cost of free access to Internet sites,
freeware, and shareware. The danger related to spyware, mainly identity theft (Naraine, 2005), has prompted the
government to take action (McGuire, 2004), with Congress passing two bills, the Internet Spyware Protection Act and the
Spy Act, which designate installing spyware to break into someone’s computer as a federal crime and levy hefty civil
penalties.
There are often factors that led us to choose anti-spyware as the representative for protective technologies in this study.
Spyware is not created to disrupt or destroy a computer system, but it is designed to function unnoticed by users for as long
as possible. It is usually discovered only when too many spyware and adware programs cause sluggish processing, system
conflicts, pop-up ads, browser hijacking, and other irritating events on user systems. What makes spyware more dangerous
than a virus is how it compromises a user’s privacy and could lead to identity theft (Naraine, 2005). The most damaging
possibility is that the presence of spyware on corporate desktops could compromise regulatory compliance efforts by leaking
private customer data that the corporation is entrusted to protect and, therefore, create legal vulnerabilities (Johnson,
2004). Thus, the impact of spyware on individuals and organizations may be more far-reaching than that of a virus which
could paralyze systems in an organization, but only for a short period of time.
Another reason we chose to focus on spyware and anti-spyware is related to the difficulty of raising the awareness of
spyware threats among computer users. Because spyware is designed to stay on the computer without causing system
disruptions, it can remain undetected and function for long periods of time inconspicuously and surreptitiously. Clearing
spyware is often harder than clearing computer viruses from infected systems. In many senses, spyware intrusion is harder to
defend against, and disinfection is more complicated than in the case of computer viruses. Sometimes, because of bad
programming, but more often intentionally, spyware writes a large number of Windows registry changes, which makes
clearing spyware an even more difficult task. In addition, many users seem to accept spyware as the price for getting
freeware and shareware from the Internet without being fully aware of the consequences (Delio, 2004; Stafford and
Urbaczewski, 2004). In a study released by the National Cyber Security Alliance, a partnership between the tech industry
and the Homeland Security Department, an estimated 90 percent of computers using high speed Internet connections
collected at least one spyware or adware program (Cha, 2004; Markoff, 2004). Nevertheless, according to studies,
spyware seems to generate lackadaisical reactions from Internet users in spite of the predicted dire consequences (Delio,
2004; Roberts, 2004). Consumers continue to use their home PCs for sensitive, online transactions without adequately
protecting themselves from potential cyber-crimes (Baig, 2004; Milne et al., 2004). “Most people think they're safe, but they
really don't know what's on their computer, and boy, are they vulnerable” (Webb, 2004). User attitudes toward possible
identity theft or the compromise of sensitive information due to spyware, security breaches, and other negative technologies
strongly resembles the famous “It won’t happen to me” attitudes broadly researched and discussed in the crime and disease
prevention literature (e.g., Biglan and Taylor, 2000; Boyd and Chubb, 1994; Fried, 1987; Hoffer and Straub, 1989; Hu
and Dinev, 2005). Thus, we believe that anti-spyware technologies provide a rich and valid test context for our user
behavioral model.

3.2 Construct and Survey Instrument Development
The research model was empirically tested using data collected from a survey developed based on the research model as
shown in Figure 1. Measurement items of the survey instrument are provided in Appendix I. The measurements for the TPB
constructs—behavioral intention (BI), attitudes toward behavior (AB), subjective norm (SN), and perceived behavioral control
(PBC)—as well as measurements for the perceived usefulness (PU), perceived ease of use (PEOU), self-efficacy (SE), and
controllability (C), were adapted from existing instruments in the literature and refined through a pilot study. More
specifically, we adapted BI, SN, and AB from Taylor and Todd (1995) and Pavlou and Fygenson (2006). We based the
measures of PBC on Koufaris (2002) and Taylor and Todd (1995), as well as on the criterion items developed by Pavlou
and Fygenson (2006) as direct PBC indicators. PU and PEOU were based on Venkatesh and Davis (1996), Taylor and
Todd (1995), and Koufaris (2002), C was adapted from Taylor and Todd’s (1995) measures of Resource and Technology
Facilitating Conditions and Venkatesh (2000). Finally we adapted SE from Bandura (1986) and Pavlou and Fygenson
(2006). For each construct, we used two sets of three to four items, one set asking about “cleaning” of spyware, the other
about “protecting” against spyware.
It should be noted that we operationalized PBC as a separate construct that mediates the effects of self-efficacy (SE) and
controllability (C) on behavioral intention (BI). This is in contrast to Pavlou and Fygenson’s (2006) view of PBC as a secondorder construct with SE and C as its underlying formative factors. Their approach is in accordance with TPB, where the
control belief structures are combined into the unidimensional PBC construct (Ajzen, 2002). Such monolithic beliefs,
however, pose problems in three aspects: 1) they may not be consistently related to the determinants of behavioral intention
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(AB, SN, and PBC) (Taylor and Todd, 1995); 2) these belief sets composed as higher-order unidimensional constructs
cannot be analyzed empirically by some of the modern structural equation modeling (SEM) statistical approaches, like
LISREL, which makes it difficult to operationalize TPB (Taylor and Todd, 1995; Chin, 1998); and 3) latent variables
constructed with formative indicators are not invariant and applicable across various statistical analytical techniques, and
testing them or applying them in nomological nets of various models may only be accomplished through partial least
squares (PLS). Using formative indicators for latent constructs can generate erroneous and even misleading results when
SEM techniques such as LISREL are used, and is viewed as “a common mistake in psychological and sociological journals
leading to serious questions concerning the validity of the results and conclusions” (Chin, 1998, p. vii). Attempts to explicitly
model formative indicators in an SEM “have been shown to lead to identification problems, with efforts to work around
them generally unsuccessful” (Chin, 1998, p. vii).
To address these limitations, Taylor and Todd (1995) introduced the decomposed TPB model, where all the belief structures
are decomposed into multidimensional constructs in a way that is consistent and generalizable across different settings and
statistical methods, in the spirit of TAM’s decomposition of attitudinal beliefs (Davis et al., 1989). In Taylor and Todd’s
decomposed model, the underlying control belief structure was also decomposed into the original components discussed by
Ajzen (1985, 2002): self-efficacy and controllability. For these reasons, in our testing procedure we followed Taylor and
Todd’s (1995) approach by decomposing all beliefs, including SE and C, and introducing them as antecedents to PBC.
The development of the scales for the new construct introduced in the theoretical model, technology awareness (TA), was
initiated by examining prior work on similar constructs in different fields, such as innovation awareness (Rogers, 1995),
belief and behavior awareness in sociology (Myers et al., 1996), sexual awareness (Snell et al., 1991; Snell and
Wooldridge, 1998), family awareness in psychology (Kolevzon, 1985); situational awareness in cognitive sciences (Adams
et al., 1995; Durso and Gronlund, 2000; Endsley, 1995; Sarter and Woods, 1991); medical sciences disease prevention
management (Vega et al. 1998), and privacy-related IS research (Dinev and Hart, 2006). The existing social awareness
instruments (Green and Kamimura, 2003; Dinev and Hart, 2006) provided important guidance and a base upon which to
build. We substantially modified the instruments by deleting, rewording, and adding items. Consistent with current best
practices in scale development (Clark and Watson, 1995; Hinkin, 1998; Smith and McCarthy, 1995), we initially cast a
wider net of candidate items. Based on an additional search of the Internet and academic, professional, and popular
literature, we drafted an initial list of 10 items. We then pilot-tested the instrument for clarity, consistency, and validity with
87 students from the authors’ programming classes. Following Churchill (1979), we performed scale purification and
refinement, but, in general, the pilot test resulted in only minor changes to the instrument.
Table 2. Demographic Profile of the Survey Respondents
Type
Age

Sex
Major

Category

Distribution (%)

<=20
21-30
31-40
>41
Male
Female
MIS or Computer Science
Other Business Major
Other

11.7
68.4
13.9
6.0
57.5
42.5
47.5
49.0
3.5

3.3 Survey Administration and Descriptive Statistics
We administered the survey instrument to IS professionals and to students of a large Southeastern university to collect data
for testing the research model. Students enrolled in various classes were asked to complete the online questionnaire during
class time. Alternatively, students who did not have access to computers in their classes were asked to fill out a paper
survey. Additionally, we initiated an e-mail campaign with a request for IS professionals who graduated from this university
with MIS/CS degrees to participate in this study. We posted links to the online survey on our web sites. Over a period of
four weeks, we received 339 responses, of which seven were unusable because of many missing data items. The
demographic characteristics of the respondents are shown in Table 2 and Table 3, and the psychometric properties of the
awareness construct from the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) stage are shown in Table 4.
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Table 3. Computer Skill Profile of the Survey Respondents
Computer Knowledge ()
Overall
MIS/CS
N=332
N=161
56.6
34.8
23.8
30.4
19.6
34.8
Knowledge of Spyware

Scale
Basica
Advancedb
Application developmentc

Business
N=163
81.0
17.8
1.2

Other
N=8
0
14.3
85.7

Never heard of it

2.7

2.5

3.1

0

Don’t know details

16.0

6.9

24.5

28.6

Don’t know what to do

26.6

19.4

33.7

28.6

Know what to do

16.3

15.6

16.6

28.6

Fully aware and know
38.4
55.6
22.1
14.3
how to protect themselves
a. Basic skills – limited to Word processing, use of e-mail, browsing on the Internet;
b. Advanced computer skills – include basic skills plus ability to manage, configure and install applications;
c. Application development – include advanced skills plus use of programming languages to develop applications.

4. Results and Analyses
4.1 Measurement Validation
We tested the research model through Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) using LISREL. The covariance structure model
consists of two parts: the measurement model (sometimes referred to as CFA stage), and the structural model (also known
as the SEM stage) (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1989). We used the two-stage approach, as recommended by Anderson and
Gerbing (1988), to first assess the quality of our measures through the CFA stage, and then to test the hypotheses through
the structural model, the SEM stage. The CFA stage was performed on the entire set of items simultaneously, with each
observed variable restricted to load on its a priori factor. We conducted all the necessary steps in validation of the
measurement model and reliability assessment following the widely used validation heuristics recommended for SEM by
Byrne (1998) and Gefen et al. (2000). We found that for each construct, all items from the “cleaning” and “protecting” sets
loaded into one common factor. For the parsimony of the study, we reduced the number of items to the generally accepted
three, with the exception of the new construct, awareness, for which the final number of items is five.
The analysis resulted in a converged, proper solution with a low χ2 per degree of freedom and a good fit as indicated by all
the listed fit indices. Collectively, the data from the model fit indices (Table 7), factor loadings, and t-values (Table 5)
suggest that the indicators account for a large portion of the variance of the corresponding latent constructs and therefore
provide support for the convergent validity of the measures (Bollen, 1989; Gefen et al., 2000).
Discriminant validity refers to the extent to which measures of the different model dimensions are unique. It is generally
assessed by testing whether the correlations between pairs of dimensions are significantly different from unity (Anderson and
Gerbing, 1988). Thus, discriminant validity is supported if the correlations between constructs are not equal or close to
1.00 within 95 percent confidence intervals (Bagozzi, 1991). The highest value of the correlations in our study is .79
between PEOU and PBC with an error term of .04. Thus, with 95percent confidence, the correlation is lying in the interval
between .71 and .87. Additionally, discriminant validity can be tested through evaluating pair wise χ2 difference tests
between the constrained (fixed correlation φij between two constructs) and unconstrained covariance structures (Segars,
1997; Gefen et al., 2000). In order to establish discriminant validity, the χ2 value of the unconstrained model must be
significantly lower than that of the constrained model. For each model run with a fixed φij, the difference in χ2 was in the
tens – considerably greater than the cut-off value of 3.84. Thus, the second and more rigorous technique provided strong
evidence for discriminant validity of the measures used in the study. Third, the squared correlations between all latent
constructs (Table 6) were significantly less than the corresponding AVE (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). All the criteria
adequately demonstrated discriminant validity of the model.
A measure of the internal consistency of the scales is the composite reliability (sometimes called reliability coefficient)
computed in conformance with the formula prescribed by Werts et al. (1974). Compared to Cronbach's alpha which
provides a lower bound estimate of the internal consistency, the composite reliability is a more rigorous estimate for the
reliability (Chin and Gopal, 1995). A composite reliability greater than .5 would indicate that at least 50 percent of the
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variance in a measurement is captured by the trait variance and that the variance captured by the measures is greater than
the one captured by the errors (Bagozzi, 1991). The recommended values of composite reliability for establishing
acceptable model reliability are above .70 (Werts et al., 1974; Gefen et al., 2000) and for establishing strong reliability are
above .80 (Koufteros, 1999). The reliability coefficients of the constructs in this study are given in Table 5. The lowest
composite reliability is .77, whereas the rest are above .81. The high values of the reliability coefficients provide further
evidence of reliability of the scales.
Table 4. Psychometric Characteristics of the Technology Awareness Construct
Item

Mean

Standard Deviation

TA1
TA2
TA3
TA4
TA5

2.97
3.23
3.42
3.09
3.74

1.12
1.12
1.09
1.12
.98

Corrected Item-Total
Correlation
.69
.65
.72
.62
.60

Cronbach’s α

EFA Factor
Loadings
.81
.78
.83
.76
.74

0.85

Table 5. CFA - Latent Variable Statistics and Psychometric Properties
Latent
Variable

Behavioral
Intention
(BI)
Attitudes
toward
Behavior
(AB)
Subjective
Norm
(SN)
Perceived
Behavioral
Control
(PBC)

Item

BI1
BI2
BI3
AB1
AB2
AB3

Technology
Awareness
(TA)
Control
lability
(C)
Self-Efficacy
(SE)

AB
SN
PBC
PEOU
PU
TA
C
BI
α =.86 α =.92 α =.90 α =.86 α =.84 α =.87 α =.85 α =.84
.81(.04)
.87(.04)
.67(.04)
.66(.04)
.76(.03)

Relia
bility

SE
α=.86
14.55
18.58
20.10
17.51
22.59

.75(.04)
.89(.04)

20.10

SN2

.85(.04)

21.24

PBC1

.91(.05)

18.61

PBC2

.84(.05)

17.81

PU1
PU2
PU3
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
C1
C2
C3
SE1
SE2

.83

.77

21.19

SN1

Perceived PEOU1
Ease of Use PEOU2
(PEOU) PEOU3
Perceived
Usefulness
(PU)

tvalue

Latent Construct Loading and Error term

.71(.05)
.95(.05)

13.35
17.99

.95(.05)

.86

.87

.91

19.18
.68(.04)
.75(.04)
.87(.04)
.84(.06)
.82(.06)
.86(.05)
.74(.06)
.71(.05)

SE3

14.75
19.35
21.97
15.21
14.64
15.97
12.88
14.22
.99(.04)
22.65
1.01(.04)
22.42
.62(.05)
11.38
.83(.04) 19.85
.94(.04) 22.30

.81

.93

.92

.94

.80(.05) 16.40
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Table 6. Latent Variable Statistics*
Mean
BI
3.73
AB
4.37
SN
3.71
PBC
3.28
PEOU 3.19
PU
4.28
TA
3.29
C
3.52
SE
3.38
*The correlations
construct.

Std.
BI
Dev.
.84
.62
.77
.55(.04)
.90
.41(.05)
.64
.43(.05)
.96
.35(.06)
.78
.48(.05)
1.42 .66(.04)
.92
.42(.05)
.91
.44(.05)
and error terms ( )

AB

SN

PBC

PEOU

PU

TA

C

SE

.53
.34(.05)
.28(.06)
.16(.06)
.62(.04)
.46(.05)
.32(.05)
.24(.06)
are shown

.76
.18(.06) .77
.20(.06) .79(.03) .77
.50(.05) .18(.06) .20(.06) .59
.48(.05) .40(.06) .41(.05) .50(.05) .63
.38(.05) .61(.04) .61(.04) .43(.05) .60(.04) .80
.36(.05) .69(.04) .78(.03) .35(.05) .56(.04) .72(.03) .79
in the off-diagonal terms. The diagonal terms indicate the AVE for each

Table 7. CFA and SEM Goodness of Fit Indices
IFI

GFI

AGFI

RMR

RMS
EA

>.9
0

≈.9
0

>.80

<.05
5

<.80
0

.94

.94

.88

.83

.056

.065

.93

.94

.94

.88

.83

.052

.062

.92

.93

.93

.88

.81

.066

.069

Goodness of Fit Measures

χ2 (d.f.)

χ2/d.f

NFI

Good Model Fit Ranges

Non-sign.

<2.00

>.90

CFA Model

687.69
(288)

2.39

.90

.93

SEM Model

677.85
(298)

2.27

.90

SEM Model – classic TPB without
Awareness
(per Pavlou and Fygenson, 2006)

589.75
(193)

3.05

.92

NNFI

CFI

>.90 >.90

Table 8: Summary of Model Relationships for the whole sample
Relationship

Description

H1
H2
H3
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11

TA - > AB
TA - > SN
TA - > BI
AB - > BI
SN - > BI
PBC - > BI
C - > PBC
SE - > PBC
PU - > AB
PU - > SN
PEOU - >AB
PEOU - > PBC
PEOU - > BI
PU - > BI

Statistical
Significance
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
no
<0.01
<0.01
no
<0.01
<0.01
no
<0.01
no
no

Completely Standardized Path Coefficient
.21
.33
.43
.29
NS
.16
.29
NS
.52
.32
NS
.61
NS
NS

Finally, we addressed the threat of common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Straub et al., 2004). By ensuring
anonymity to the respondents, assuring them that there were no right or wrong answers, requesting that each question be
answered as honestly as possible, and providing no incentive for participating in the study, we reduced the likelihood of bias
caused by social desirability or respondent acquiescence (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Also, following Podsakoff et al. (2003),
we empirically determined the common method variance using Harman’s single-factor test by simultaneously loading all
items in factor analysis using Varimax rotation. All indicators showed high factor loadings and low cross-loadings. Each
principal component explained almost an equal amount of the 72 percent total variance, ranging from 11.4 percent to

398

Volume 8

Issue 7

Article 2

17.8 percent. This indicates that our data do not suffer from common method bias.

4.2 Structural Model Testing
The SEM stage specifies the direct and indirect causal relationships among the constructs and the amount of unexplained
variance (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). We report the goodness of fit indices in Table 7. All the values are within an
acceptable range for good model fit and, thus, indicate empirical support of the theoretical framework. The structural
model (Figure 2) shows the completely standardized parameter estimates among all latent variables. The results provided
strong support for the majority of the hypotheses of the study, with most of the path coefficients statistically significant at
level .01. Table 8 provides a summary of the support of the hypotheses.

Technology
Awareness (TA)

Behavioral
Intention (BI)

.43
NS

Perceived
Usefulness (PU)

.21

NS

NS
.32

Self-efficacy
(SE)

.61

NS

.16

Attitude (AB)

.52

Perceived Ease
of Use (PEOU)

.29

.33

Subjective
Norm (SN)

NS

Controllability
(C)

.29

Perceived
Behavioral
Control (PBC)

Figure 2. Structural Equation Model with Completely Standardized Parameter Estimates
* (Bold denotes statistical significance at level p<.01. NS = not statistically significant.)

5. Discussion and Post-Hoc Analysis
The empirical results of our study rendered clear support for its core hypotheses: the centrality of technology awareness in
the formation of user attitudes toward and behavior surrounding usage of protective technologies, in this case, antispyware. Additionally, a strong correlation exists in our model between awareness and all of the other belief constructs
included (see Table 6, shaded row). Indeed, higher awareness and conscious knowledge of the need to use protective
technologies affect the perception of their usefulness (PU) and are related to the perception of ease of use (PEOU).
Similarly, higher awareness increases users’ confidence that they can successfully prevent negative technologies in their
system (SE), as well as their belief that they has the skills and tools (C) to successfully combat the effects of negative
technologies through the use of protective technologies.
Furthermore, the previously well-established relationships between the major constructs of TPB and TAM in the context of
positive technologies were largely reconfirmed in the context of protective technologies, suggesting strong generalizability
and robustness of the TPB theoretical framework. However, there are some notable exceptions. Some of the previously
established TPB and TAM relationships were not found to be statistically significant in our data. These relationships involve
perceived usefulness (PU), perceived ease of use (PEOU), subjective norm (SN), and self-efficacy (SE). Because the
measurement instruments used for these constructs have been tested and validated in current and previous studies, we are
confident that these findings were not due to measurement error. Hence, we believe that there are theoretical reasons for
the lack of statistical significance in those relationships. In particular, we believe that they reflect the specificity of the
technologies in question – protective technologies that have no immediate benefit for the users in terms of job performance
or job satisfaction and, therefore, do not manifest their usefulness and ease of use directly and positively, as is often the
case in the context of positive technologies.
The insignificance in the relationship between PEOU and AB (R8) could be attributed to the phenomenon that a user may
use a protective technology not because he or she likes it but because he or she perceives there is a real threat to the
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computer and/or the personal information it contains. In that sense, the perceived ease of use is less likely to affect his or
her attitude toward using the technology. This is analogous to a medical situation where whether an individual feels that a
protective measure such as an exam or a procedure is easy or not has little to do with his or her attitude toward going to
the office to be examined or treated. The individual feels compelled to use protective measures as long as he or she
perceives that the technology or treatment is useful, regardless of whether it is easy to use.
A similar argument can be made about the diminished influence of self-efficacy on perceived behavioral control (R5). An
individual may feel compelled to use anti-spyware or anti-virus technologies regardless of how much confidence she or he
has in using them. Again, the awareness of the threat is a compelling enough reason to act, even if it means that one has to
struggle to get it right. The lack of statistical significance of SE on PBC in our study adds to the surrounding controversy
about the nature and measurement of PBC and its components SE and C and may illuminate further research efforts.
The direct link of PEOU and PU on BI (R10 and R11), in accordance with the majority of the TAM models, was not
supported in our study. Neither relationship was statistically significant, making TA the only belief construct that has a direct
effect on BI (H3). The data seem to suggest that in the case of using protective technologies, just the perception of
usefulness or ease of use is not enough to motivate users to act. Rather, it is the awareness of the consequences of not
using the technologies that motivates users to act, regardless of other attitudes and control beliefs. This result highlights the
most significant difference between positive technologies and protective technologies: while people use positive
technologies for their designed utilities on which PU and PEOU will have a significant impact, they use protective
technologies mainly out of fear of the consequences of not using them. In fact, this finding is quite consistent with prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which suggests that people are more inclined to avoid losses than to pursue gains.
The lack of statistical significance between SN and BI (R2) renders mixed results with regard to the core concept of TPB.
While several other TPB-based studies found similar lack of support (Mathieson, 1991; Pavlou and Fygenson, 2006), we
believe that, in the context of our study, and given the importance of social pressure in dealing with threats and social
problems in general, it is harder to explain without a further analysis of the empirical data. For that purpose, we ran a
model excluding the awareness construct, reducing it to the ones previously reported in the literature (e.g., Pavlou and
Fygenson, 2006). The new model preserved the essence of all other relationships (including the lack of statistical
significance between PEOU and AB, SE and PBC, PU and BI, and PEOU and BI) except for the SN-BI link, which became
statistically significant at level .01 with a path coefficient of .19. Testing this alternative model was important for three
reasons. First, it reproduced and, thus, validated our empirical results with respect to the previously published models.
Second, the fit indices of the alternative model were lower (Table 7), with χ2/d.f. significantly higher than our SEM model
indicating that the latter indeed described better the empirical data. Third, the change of the SN-BI relationship confirmed
the importance of the direct relationship between technology awareness and behavioral intention (H3). Without the
awareness construct present in the model, SN becomes a dominant construct and renders a statistically significant effect on
BI.
The above argument, however, does not explain why the importance of the subjective norm on behavioral intention is
diminished in the presence of the awareness construct. Our expectations were that an increased awareness, through its
strong effect on SN and through the strong effect of SN on BI, would strongly influence BI both indirectly and directly. After
all, raising the awareness of a problem should heighten the sense of urgency in an individual’s social circles about taking
action, and in doing so, influence the individual’s own behavior. To understand the nature of the SN-BI relationship better,
we performed a multi-group analysis on two distinguishable groups that constituted our sample: 161 respondents with
MIS/CS degrees or majors (i.e. advanced IT users), and 163 respondents with other business degrees (i.e. basic IT users).
The computer skills of the two groups are shown in Table 2. After validating the instrument items by establishing convergent
and discriminant validity and reliability for each group, we proceeded to test the model separately for each group. Four of
the path coefficients proved to be statistically different between the two groups, as established by the χ2 difference test. The
differences are given in Table 9.
Table 9. Path Coefficients for Each Group *
Relationship
R2
R7
H3
R3

Description
SN-BI
PU-SN
TA-BI
PBC-BI

Advanced IT Group
.23
NS
.11
.27

Basic IT Group
NS
.58
.52
NS

Full Sample
NS
.32
.43
.16

*All path coefficients are significant at level .01, except for NS (not significant) and the bold which is significant at
level .05.
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It is immediately clear that the influence of subjective norm (SN) on behavioral intention (BI) (R2) is stronger for the
advanced IT group than for the basic IT group. We believe that the advanced IT group is more cohesive than the basic IT
group, and individuals communicate to a greater extent about IT-related issues and are keen to learn what their peers are
using to solve a problem. Thus, the influence of peers on individual behavior tends to be stronger in the advanced IT group
than in the basic IT group. In the advanced IT group, the greater awareness they have, the more they tend to discuss and
seek solutions within their social circles, exchange know-how and ideas. In contrast, awareness appears to inspire action
rather than communication in the basic IT group, as shown by the significantly larger TA-BI (H3) relationship. Due to the
loose ties among the members who were from a variety of majors in different colleges, we assume there was little discussion
about computer technologies, thus their social circles exerted minimal influence on how to react to a cyber threat such as
spyware. One implication of this finding is that an effective approach to reach socially diverse groups is to establish proactive social networks to educate and advocate the necessity to protect against certain threats, such as negative
technologies.
The weaker (or lack of) influence of PU on SN (R7) for the advanced IT group can also be explained by the characteristics of
the two groups. Advanced IT users are more prone to experiment with a technology even if its usefulness is in doubt. Thus,
mere suggestions to use or try a tool, especially if it deals with security and protecting one’s computer, might influence
advanced IT peers much more than basic IT users who may need first to be convinced that the tool is useful before feeling
social pressure .
The weaker relationship between TA and BI (H3) for the advanced IT group can be attributed to the stronger SN influence
on BI for that group. Indeed, because basic IT users do not tend to discuss technology-related issues as much as advanced
IT users, being aware of a problem may inspire them to act, while the members of the advanced IT group may weigh their
peers’ opinion more heavily before acting.
Finally, we shall note that for the basic IT group, PBC does not have a significant effect on behavioral intention (BI) (R3).
This may be attributed to the characteristics of the basic group, as discussed above. We suspect that individuals in the basic
IT group perceived little sense of control when dealing with viruses or spyware threats and computer technologies in
general, as evidenced by the low level of mean value of PBC for the basic IT group: 1.7 versus 3.2 for the advanced IT
group. The subsequent t-test confirmed that the difference was significant. This was consistent with previous discussions
about the behavior of basic IT users. They seemed to be influenced more by fear as the result of awareness and less by
utility of the protective technologies.

6. Theoretical and Practical Implications
Our findings have both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, we found that in the context of using protective
technologies, some of the previously-established important relationships between user behavior and positive technologies
no longer hold. In the presence of threats from negative technologies, it is fear of the dire consequences of not using
protective technologies that motivates people to act. In dealing with negative technologies, conventional motivational
factors such as perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEOU) become less meaningful or at least less
significant. Instead, awareness was shown to be particularly salient in understanding the user behavior pertaining to
protective technologies. The extended theory of user behavior presented in this study, however, is not limited to protective
technologies. We submit that it is possible to generalize the findings to other classes of technologies, including those that
are utilitarian and hedonic. Indeed, awareness of any technologies or awareness of problems and the ways to resolve the
problems might be central to a broad spectrum of innovations at individual and organization levels.
In practical terms, our findings provide insights for managers to design more effective security policies and practices to work
in conjunction with technologies in the fight against the onslaught of spyware and other Internet-spawned negative
technologies. For example, in order to reach average computer users, it is important to create social advocacy groups and
networks that educate and raise awareness about protecting personal computer systems from the potential threats of
negative technologies. If these users do not belong to more cohesive IT-related social circles, traditional information
channels, such as television or news pages, could play an important role in developing social pressures and advocating
policies that address and compel protection and prevention of computer systems in a globally connected society. In that
sense, our research findings provide timely guidance and validation for what practitioners have already initiated in their
attempts to motivate computer users to take action against negative technologies. For example, Internet providers, software
companies, and computer makers are making an effort to increase awareness of threats and provide customers with userfriendly tools to protect themselves. Prominent information technology companies and computer makers (e.g., Dell,
Microsoft, Verizon, Amazon, AT&T, AOL, Yahoo) have launched a non-profit Internet Education Foundation to help
consumers combat spam and spyware (Bridis, 2004). In terms of designing effective training programs for information
security, our findings suggest that just teaching users how to use protective technologies is not enough; security managers
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and trainers should allocate enough time to convey the consequences of not protecting one’s computer and data. For
developing corporate security policies and procedures, our results suggest that deterrence against violations of procedures
should be articulated clearly in policies, and firms should make sure that employees are fully aware of the consequences of
non-compliance.
If we were to use one metaphor for our findings, it would be disease prevention. According to Carleton et al. (1996, Table
1), “[I]ncreased awareness is often a necessary first step before behavioral change,” a finding also supported in our study
through the direct relationship between TA and BI. Further, they report that “many respondents already have a high level of
awareness and knowledge but lack the skills for, or need additional information on, how to make behavioral changes.” This
finding is also confirmed by our results, because, in addition to awareness, other factors like perceived behavioral control
and subjective norms also contribute to a behavior. The authors recognize that “acceptance of programs is also influenced
by cultural norms” – a finding that is crucial in our model, through the subjective norm construct. Another finding, not
captured in our study, is that “the benefits of awareness and knowledge programs are dependent on the readiness of the
audience to learn and individual learning styles.” We consider examining readiness to learn and individual learning styles as
an important potential future addition to our model.

7. Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced and studied the role of technology awareness in forming an individual’s intention to use
protective technologies, defined as computer technologies that protect data and systems from viruses, unauthorized access,
disruptions, spyware, and other negative technologies designed to affect or disrupt computer systems and the individuals
using them. Drawing on the extant literature, we defined technology awareness (TA) as the user’s raised consciousness of
and interest in knowing about technological issues and problems and strategies to deal with them. We then integrated this
construct in the nomological net of TPB and TAM variables to empirically test a model of user behavioral intention,
specifically in the context of use of protective technologies. The study’s results confirmed the theoretical arguments that TA is
a central determinant to the formation of a user’s behavioral intention to use protective technologies. TA was shown to
strongly influence attitudes toward behavior, subjective norm, and behavioral intention. We also found that awareness is
highly correlated with the TPB and TAM beliefs such as perceived controllability, self-efficacy, perceived ease of use, and
perceived usefulness.
There are certain limitations of the study that may also inform a number of possibilities for future research on awareness
and user behavior pertaining to protective technologies. First, the study’s results regarding perceived behavioral control and
its antecedents (self-efficacy and controllability) showed the complex nature of the construct. The treatment we adopted
could be debatable and warrants further exploration. Second, we acknowledge that the technology awareness construct
might not be specific enough to the behaviors in our operationalization. We adopted a broader definition of awareness,
while its evidently multidimensional nature could call for a more refined approach. Future refinement of the construct could
distinguish between awareness of a problem and awareness of a solution to that problem. An integrative, multidimensional
approach to awareness could enrich the findings of the current study. For example, Biglan and Taylor (2000) argue that the
process of building awareness about a certain issue involves an analysis of the issue that articulates (a) the harms
associated with its presence, (b) the causes of its presence, and (c) the programs and policies that could reduce its
presence. Therefore, future multidimensional approaches could involve the diagnostic and control components as an
underlying causal mechanism, along with personal risk aversion, past experience of security violations, and experience with
computers. With respect to the latter, group differences between basic and advanced IT users observed in the current study’s
post-hoc analysis should be theoretically explored in a future expanded model. Another potential research direction is to
expand the current study on why some users exhibit the “won’t happen to me” philosophy, i.e., even being aware of the
negative consequences, some individuals still accept the presence of the negative technologies as the “price” of working
with computers and being connected to the Internet.
Furthermore, our data were gathered from a more or less convenient sample, which may be biased toward college-age
computer users. Future studies could expand the sample to include a more diversified demographic population. Finally, an
important future research direction could be to study how awareness impacts other constructs studied within the TPB and
TAM frameworks. Our current study focused on validating the construct of awareness and its impact on user behavioral
intentions. However, more theoretical insights could be ascertained by examining how the addition of awareness alters the
relationships between other established constructs in the TPB and TAM model in various contexts.
Notwithstanding these limitations, we hope our study has made a clear distinction among positive, negative, and protective
technologies and called for the attention of IS researchers to the unique issues involved in the acceptance of protective
technologies at both individual and organizational levels. By arguing that awareness plays a central role in the acceptance
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of protective technology, we believe that the theoretical framework for user behavior surrounding technology and the
management practices related to information security can be further advanced by this and future research.
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Appendix 1. Instrument Items
All items employed the 5 point Likert scale (Completely Disagree to Completely Agree), unless specified otherwise.
Construct

Item
BI1

Behavioral
Intention (BI)

BI2
BI3

Attitudes
toward
Behavior
(AB)

AB1

Subjective
Norm
(SN)

SN1

Perceived
Behavioral
Control
(PBC)

AB2
AB3

SN2
PBC1
PBC2

PEOU
1
Perceived
PEOU
Ease of Use
2
(PEOU)
PEOU
3
PU1
Perceived
PU2
Usefulness
(PU)
PU3

Awareness
(TA)
Control
lability
(C)
Self-Efficacy
(SE)

TA1
TA2
TA3
TA4
TA5
C1
C2
C3
SE1
SE2
SE3

Question
I intend to periodically use anti-spyware applications to protect my computer from spyware.
In the immediate future I intend to customize my browser and computer settings to prevent the
intrusion of spyware to my computer.
I intend to periodically check my browser and computer settings to prevent the intrusion of
spyware to my computer.
For me, cleaning spyware from my computer would be: (Very bad idea – Very good idea)
For me, preventing spyware from self-installing on my computer would be: (Very bad idea –
Very good idea)
For me, protecting my computer from spyware would be: (Very bad idea – Very good idea)
Most people who are important to me think it is a good idea to clean spyware from my
computers.
Most people who are important to me think it is a good idea to prevent spyware from running
on my computer.
Please rate the difficulty for you to clean spyware from your computer using anti-spyware
applications. (Extremely difficult – Extremely easy)
Please rate the difficulty for you to protect your computer from spyware. (Extremely difficult –
Extremely easy)
The process of configuring my computer to protect from spyware is clear and understandable.
It would be easy for me to prevent spyware from running on my computer.
It would be easy for me to clean my computer from spyware.
I believe it is beneficial to protect my computer from spyware.
I believe protecting from spyware will enhance my effectiveness in working with computer.
I believe cleaning spyware off my computer will enhance my effectiveness in working with
computer.
I follow news and developments about the spyware technology.
I discuss with friends and people around me security issues of Internet.
I read about the problems of malicious software intruding Internet users’ computers.
I seek advice on computer web sites or magazines about anti-spyware products.
I am aware of the spyware problems and consequences.
I have the skill and resources to clean spyware from my computer.
I have the skill and resources to protect my computer from spyware.
Whether or not to clean spyware from my computer is completely under my control.
I am confident that I can clean spyware off my system
I am confident I can prevent unauthorized intrusion to my computer.
I believe I can configure my computer to provide good protection from spyware.
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